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Database management systems (DBMS), which are  
the ultimate layer in preventing malicious data access  
or corruption, implement several security mechanisms  
to  protect  data.  However  these  mechanisms  cannot  
always  stop  malicious  users  from  accessing  to  the  
data by exploiting system vulnerabilities.  This paper  
presents a study towards the proposal of an intrusion  
detection mechanism for DBMS. The approach uses a 
directed graph representing the profile of valid trans-
actions  to  detect  unauthorized  ones,  which  are seen  
as invalid sequences of SQL1 commands. This is done  
by  analyzing  the  commands  the  users  execute  and  
comparing them to the profile of the authorized trans-
actions previously learned.
1. Introduction
A major problem faced by organizations today is the 
protection of their data against malicious access or cor-
ruption. Database security mechanisms offer basic secu-
rity features such as authentication, authorization, access 
control,  data encryption, and auditing. However, these 
mechanisms  do  not  assure  protection  against  DBMS 
vulnerabilities exploits and are very limited in defending 
data attacks from the inside or from unsecured applica-
tions. 
The general  lack  of  intrusion detection features in 
commercial DBMS is an important limitation since ma-
licious actions in a database environment may not be fil-
tered by existing intrusion detection mechanisms at the 
network or the operating system levels. For example, in-
side attacks (e.g., a disgruntled employee that may ac-
cess and damage critical private data) are particularly 
difficult to detect and isolate, because as these attacks 
are carried out by legitimate users that may have access 
rights to data and system resources. In  addition,  mas-
querade attacks where people hide their identity by im-
personating others are one of the most frequent forms of 
1 SQL stands for Structured Query Language, the language used by 
relational DBMS
computer security attacks [1]. Another example is SQL 
injection in web applications, where an attacker changes 
the SQL commands sent to the server, and therefore, ac-
cessing sensitive data.
Intrusion detection mechanisms for DBMS have not 
been studied much, in a clear contrast to what has hap-
pened in operating systems and networking fields. How-
ever, recent works have addressed concurrent intrusion 
detection and attack isolation in DBMS, and this issue is 
clearly receiving more and more attention. DEMIDS [2] 
is  a  misuse  detection  system  tailored  to  relational 
database systems. It  uses the audit logs to derive user 
profiles that describe typical behaviors. In [3] a real-time 
intrusion detection mechanism based on the profile of 
user roles obtained by mining database logs is proposed. 
An intrusion attack and isolation mechanism is proposed 
in [4]. Vieira and Madeira [5] propose a mechanism for 
the  detection  of  malicious transactions  (sequences  of 
SQL commands creating a unit of interaction in DBMS) 
based on the manual definition of the transaction pro-
files.
This paper  presents our research study towards the 
definition  of  an  intrusion  detection  mechanism  for 
DBMS. The approach is based on the fact that the users 
usually interact with the database through a well defined 
application interface. Therefore, the user does not exe-
cute ad-hoc transactions but are confined to those pro-
grammed in the code of the application. A database is a 
transactional environment and the set of transactions a 
given user executes may be viewed as an abstraction of 
that  user's  behavior.  This represents the  user's  profile 
and the assumption is that knowing the profiles of all the 
users of the database is the key to detect intrusions. If a 
user’s actions do not match a known profile, it is consid-
ered an intruder. 
Our proposal is to describe each database transaction 
as a directed graph representing the corresponding se-
quence of SQL commands. In a first step, this sequence 
of  commands is  obtained by analyzing the  execution 
profile of the database applications.  After learning the 
authorized transactions the intrusion detector concurrent-
ly monitors the commands the user executes and com-
pares them with the directed graph.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 
presents our current approach for transactions learning 
and intrusion detection. Section 3 presents some prelimi-
nary results. Section 4 concludes the paper and presents 
future research directions.
2. Proposed approach
In a typical database environment the transactions are 
programmed in the database application, which means 
that the set of transactions remains stable, as long as the 
database application is not changed. For example, in a 
banking database application users can only perform the 
predefined operations available at the application inter-
face (e.g., withdraw money, balance check account, etc). 
No other operation is available for those users. Normal-
ly, end-users cannot execute ad-hoc SQL commands. 
In our work we use the profile of the transactions im-
plemented by the database applications to identify user 
attempts  to  execute  malicious  SQL  commands.  A 
database transaction is represented by a directed graph 
describing the different SQL execution paths  from the 
beginning to the end of each transaction. The nodes in 
the graph represent commands and the arcs represent the 
valid command sequences. Depending on the data being 
processed,  several  execution  paths  may  exist  for  the 
same transaction and an execution path may include cy-
cles representing the repetitive execution of sets of com-
mands  (a typical example of cycles in a transaction is 
the  insertion of  a  variable  number  of  lines in  a  cus-
tomer’s order). The transaction ends with a commit or 
rollback command.
Our intrusion detection approach comprises a learn-
ing phase and a detection phase. In the first phase the 
transaction profiles are learned through the identification 
of the authorized sequences of SQL commands, which 
result in a directed graph. In the second phase they are 
used to detect deviating behaviors, which are considered 
to be intrusions. 
One important security mechanism of DBMS is au-
diting. The audit trail can be used to perform a posteriori 
analysis of the operations done by each user in order to 
identify potential intrusion attempts. However, the anal-
ysis of the audit trail is a difficult and time consuming 
task and only serves for diagnosis or investigation pur-
poses of past security attacks. The time between a mali-
cious action and its detection is of major importance and 
every second of delay may represent loss of privacy, risk 
of data destruction, and propagation of corrupted data 
after the attack. 
Our first approach to the intrusion detection problem 
is based on the information collected by the database au-
diting mechanism. The goal is to add on-line intrusion 
detection capabilities to typical DBMS auditing system. 
In the learning phase, the audit trail is used off-line to 
generate the graphs representing the authorized transac-
tions. The minimum information that needs to be avail-
able for each executed command is the name of the user, 
the identification of the session, the identification of the 
transaction, the command text and the time stamp of the 
command. This information must be collected in con-
trolled conditions guaranteeing that the system is free of 
intrusion attempts (which would potentially lead to the 
identification  of  malicious  transactions  as  authorized 
ones). Of course,  the DBA must choose the adequate 
time window that is both representative of database uti-
lization and free of attacks. Inspection of the database 
audit trail collected during the learning window can be 
used  to  assure  that  no  malicious  actions  have  been 
learned.
After having concluded the learning phase, the detec-
tion mechanism is ready to detect intrusions. During this 
phase the audit trail  is used on-line  to obtain the se-
quence of commands executed by each user, which is 
concurrently compared to the profile of the authorized 
transactions to identify potential malicious transactions. 
The detection is done at the SQL command level. That 
is, it is not necessary to reach the end of the transaction 
where the suspicious command was found to detect the 
potential intrusion. All the transactions that have suspi-
cious commands are considered malicious and that trig-
gers several actions depending on the configuration. It 
can raise an alarm, send a message to the DBA, kill the 
session, or even activate a damage confinement proce-
dure [6].
3. Preliminary results
In this section we present the experiments conducted 
to evaluate our  intrusion detection mechanism imple-
mented over the audit trail of the Oracle 10g R2 DBMS. 
The experimental setup includes three computers con-
nected through an Ethernet broadband router/switch. We 
used two different database application scenarios in this 
evaluation: 
- A well-known database performance  benchmark, 
the  TPC-C  [7],  which  provides  a  controlled 
database  environment  quite  adequate  for  initial 
evaluation  of  the  learning  algorithm and  for  the 
evaluation of performance overhead, coverage and 
latency. The mechanism has been evaluated consid-
ering  both  transactions  generated  as  random  se-
quences of  commands and  malicious transactions 
submitted by real database users that tried to break 
the intrusion detection mechanism and change the 
database content or access data in database tables.
- A real large hospital database sterilization applica-
tion to assess mainly the transaction learning curve 
in a real situation. This allows us to obtain the time 
window  necessary  to  perform  a  representative 
learning of the transactions. 
The intrusion detection efficiency can be character-
ized by the following measures: coverage, latency, false 
positives, and impact in the performance.
The detection coverage observed for random transac-
tions was 99.23%. The small percentage of undetected 
transactions corresponds to very small  TPC-C transac-
tions whose commands were occasionally mimicked by 
the random transaction injector. However, in all the cas-
es the intrusion was immediately detected in the follow-
ing command. In reality, the intrusion detection cover-
age was 100%, if we consider the sequence of transac-
tions. 
As far as the human users are concerned, the intru-
sions have been detected in all the cases. Four people 
volunteered to test the system. Three of them are stu-
dents with basic skills and one is a professional DBA. In 
5 sessions, from a total of 132, the users managed to in-
troduce changes in the database, but they were spotted as 
an intruder in the subsequent command. The intrusion 
detection latency  is  consistently  low,  ranging  from  1 
second to 1.6 seconds. 
The performance penalty in normal load conditions 
is 6% or less. In heavy load conditions, however, perfor-
mance overhead increases up to 25%. It is important to 
note that this is mainly due to the DBMS audit feature 
being switched on.
Concerning  the  learning  curve  using  the  real 
database application, we could observe that the rate of 
transactions learning is very quick at the beginning, re-
ducing over the time. In certain periods of the day or the 
week we could see that some new transactions were exe-
cuted. This should be due to some specific procedures 
that are executed at a very specific moment.
4. Conclusion and future work
This paper presents our research work on intrusion 
detection in DBMS. The goal is to provide DBMS with 
on-line intrusion detection capability. Our approach in-
cludes two phases: one which is devoted to the learning 
of transaction profiles and another to detect malicious 
users. In the learning phase a graph with the sequence of 
commands that compose each valid transaction is built. 
In the detection phase the mechanism catches malicious 
users by detecting the transactions that fall  outside the 
learned profile.  When a intruder is detected some cor-
rective  actions  may  be  performed  (e.g.,  warning  the 
DBA, killing the malicious session, etc). 
An implementation of the proposed mechanism in 
the Oracle 10g R2 DBMS has been evaluated using the 
TPC-C benchmark and a production database used by a 
large hospital. Positive results where obtained, showing 
that the approach is valuable and can be successfully ap-
plied to current DBMS.
We are  now studying new algorithms to  improve 
performance, latency and false positives. The detection 
of ad-hoc queries executed by the DBA, managers and 
decision making personnel may be addressed by algo-
rithms adapted from those used by system masquerade 
detectors, like those used by [8,1], where the sequence of 
commands is not  important,  but the statistic usage of 
those commands is. We are also analyzing other forms 
of collecting the transaction logs from both the outside 
and the inside the DBMS. The inclusion of the whole 
system inside an open source DBMS like PostgreSQL is 
also being considered.
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